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COLLECTIVE SECURITY AND THE 
INTERNATIONAL ENFORCEMENT OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW: FRENCH AND AMERICAN 
PERSPECTIVES 
Ana Peyro Llopis· 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Is the American perspective on the enforcement of international law compatible 
with the French perspective? For American legal scholars, the term enforcement is 
sometimes used as the equivalent of the following French notions: mise en oeuvre, 
application, and also coercition. The American term enforcement appears to be used 
in situations where the French prefer legal terms that are closer to the connotation of 
implementation rather than that of enforcement. What are the consequences of the use 
of such different terms? Is there, behind the use of different language, with different 
meanings and approaches, a different perspective on the enforcement of international 
law as between France and the United States? 
The question of the enforcement of international law can be examined from at 
least two perspectives. On the one hand, it is possible to analyze the way international 
law is enforced in domestic legal orders and municipal law. But international law can 
also be enforced using international mechanisms. This Article will analyze enforce-
ment in the field of collective security, as it is the most controversial field of enforce-
ment action. The relevant mechanisms in this field are mainly economic sanctions and 
armed interventions. 
One should note that in the field of economic sanctions, the French position is 
better viewed as part of the European position. Indeed, the power to adopt sanctions 
against third-party States has been delegated by member States to the European 
Community. In this sense, it is not possible to identify a uniquely French position. 
Military sanctions are the other tool used to enforce international law that are 
analyzed in this Article. International practice has recently made military measures 
somewhat commonplace, presenting them as merely another way of enforcing 
international law. Currently, it is still possible to speak about a real French perspective 
-and not a European one--as military intervention remains mainly within the power 
of States, and is a responsibility that has only been partially delegated to the European 
Union. Moreover, European practice in this field is strongly influenced by the French 
experience. 
Furthermore, the interest of analyzing these two mechanisms of enforcement is 
that they illustrate an erroneous but common position, namely that the United States 
has a broader notion of the enforcement of international law than other States, and 
notably, one that is broader than its continental European allies. American and French 
perspectives on the enforcement of international law are in fact not as distant as one 
would imagine. 
• Maitre de conferences en droit public, Universite de Cergy-Pontoise (Paris). 
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This Article will examine and compare enforcement actions led by the United 
States and by France, and the underlying justifications for each country's respective 
actions. Such an examination raises many questions: What arguments are used to 
justify enforcement action in the field of collective security? Which arguments are 
invoked by the United States? Are the arguments France invokes as different as we 
currently assume? Does the United States truly have a broader conception of the 
legality of enforcement actions, one closer to the notion of legitimacy, while France 
defends a narrow conception of international legality? The answers to these questions 
are different than one might expect, and require further discussion. But first of all, 
clarification of the relevant words used by each country in this area oflaw is merited. 
Are the two countries speaking the same language when the United States talks about 
'enforcement,' and France talks of coercition? 
II. ENFORCEMENT AND COERC/TION: COMMENTS, DIGRESSIONS ON WORDS, 
AND DIVERSION OF MEANING 
A. The English Language: the Notion of Enforcement 
The Oxford English Dictionary defines the term enforcement as "[t]he action or 
process of enforcing." 1 Then it specifies, inter a/ia, "[t]he action or process of 
increasing the strength of anything (esp. an armed force, etc.); [] a reinforcement," 
"[ e ]nergetic activity; an effort," "[t]he urging [ of] a demand, pressing home an 
argument, representation, or statement," "[t]he action of bringing force to bear upon, 
doing violence to, or overcoming by force (a person or thing)," and "[c]onstraint, 
compulsion; a constraining or compelling influence."2 
The World Book Dictionary contains the following definition of enforcement: 
"[T]he act or process of enforcing; putting into force. "3 In addition, the term to enforce 
means: "1. to force obedience to; cause to be carried out; put into force; 2. to force; 
compel; 3. to urge with force; emphasize.'"' Finally, the World Book Encyclopedia 
refers to law enforcement as "the means by which a community, state, or country keeps 
order." 5 
Therefore, it appears that the term enforcement is defined broadly and that it 
implies in any case a certain degree of force. 
B. The French Language: The Notion of Coercition 
The French Dictionary Petit Robert defines the term coercition as the act or 
process of constraining, enforcing, and/or compelling("[ a ]ction de contraindre"). 6 To 
enforce, or contraindre, means to force someone to act against her will("[ t]orcer ( qqn) 
a agir contre sa volonte"), and futhermore, to oblige her by law ("[ o ]bliger par voie de 
1. 5 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 245 (2d ed. 1989). 
2. Id. 
3. 1 THE WORLD BOOK DICTIONARY 700 (1991). 
4. Id. 
5. 12 THE WORLD BOOK ENCYCLOPEDIA 141 (2005). 
6. LE PETIT ROBERT DICTIONNAIRE 447 (2000). 
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droit"). 7 Professors Alain Pellet and Patrick Daillier define the term contrainte in their 
treatise on international law as·"any kind of pressure other than the use of force, so 
serious as to change the decision ofa physical being [representative of the State] or a 
moral being [the State itself] to whom the pressure is applied." 8 
The Dictionnaire de droit international public-in French, although edited by the 
Belgian Professor Jean Salmon-proposes the following doctrinal definitions of 
coercition: first, the "act of constraining," 9 and second, "constraint in any form" 10 
referring to the General Assembly Resolution 2625 (XXV) adopted on October 24, 
1970. Such a definition, however, remains too general and is not sufficient to clearly 
define the French notion of enforcement, of coercition. 
Although coercition and contrainte are synonymous in this Dictionary, the 
definition of the latter brings us further information. From a general perspective, 
contrainte is the "act or threat of coercion against a subject of international law or its 
representative." 11 Contrainte can also be a "coercive measure prohibited by a primary 
rule ofinternational law [or] violence of an illegal nature. "12 But constraint can be legal 
in the following circumstances: 
[I]f[the action] is a political, economic or military act of constraint, authorized by a 
secondary rule of international law as a reaction to an internationally wrongful act, 
or if provided for by the constitutional treaty of an international organization 
empowering it to react to a treaty violation. These acts of constraint---decentralized 
or institutional-tend primarily to exert pressure on the errant State to make it cease 
its wrongful conduct. 13 
Therefore, coercition is neither legal, nor wrongful per se. Such a qualification 
depends on the existence of a previous wrongful act. 
Gerard Cornu defines coercition as the "[c]onstraint from the State, against an 
individual (imprisonment) or his property (seizure), consisting of the use of force in 
the service of the Law (for the execution of an obligation) by Lawful means, except 
7. Id. at 515. 
8. PATRICK DAILLIER & ALAIN PELLET, DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 929 (2002). My translation 
of"[T]oute forme depression autre que le recours a la force, d'une gravite suffisante pour pouvoir inflechir 
la decision de la personne physique (representant de l'Etat) ou de la personne morale (l'Etat lui-meme) 
auxquelles cette pression est appliquee." 
9. DICTIONNAIRE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 191 (Jean Salmon ed., 2001) [hereinafter 
DICTIONNAIRE SALMON]. My translation of: "[A]ction de contraindre." 
I 0. Id. My translation of: "Contrainte quelle que soit sa forme." 
11. Id. at 253. My translation of: "[A]cte ou menace de coercition exerces a l'encontre d'un sujet de 
droit international ou de son representant." 
12. Id. My translation of: "Mesure coercitive interdite par une regle 'primaire' du droit international. 
Violence ayant un caractere illicite." 
13. Id. My translation of: 
"[L]a contrainte peut etre licite lorsqu'elle est une mesure coercitive d'ordre politique, 
economique ou militaire, autorisee par une regle 'secondaire' du droit international general, 
en guise de reaction a un fait intemationalement illicite, ou prevue par le traite constitutif 
d'une organisation intemationale pour sanctionner la violation du traite. Les mesures de 
contrainte en question-<1u 'elles soient decentralisees ou institutionnelles-- tendent avant 
tout a faire pression sur l'Etat defaillant pour qu'il cesse son comportement illicite." 
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assault." 14 The act of constraining is thus the use of a legal force, which has as its 
general objective the performance oflegal obligations by one subject thereto. 
C. Lost in Translation 
The terms of enforcement and coercition are translated in an interesting way for 
the purposes of this paper. Translating from English into French, we can identify the 
following: 
coercion = coercition, contrainte 
enforcement = mise en application, imposition 
to enforce = mettre en application, appliquer, faire obeir ou faire respecter, 
imposer, appuyer 
forcible = de/par force 
Note that the noun enforcement, or its verb, to enforce, are translated in a broad way. 
On the other hand, we find that the equivalent of coercition is coercion and not 
enforcement. The same situation appears in the opposite direction. From French into 
English, we find that: 
coercition = coercion 
contrainte = constraint 
mise en oeuvre = implementation 
execution = enforcement 
Thus, from a semantic perspective, it seems that the English term enforcement is 
broader than the French terms used in the field of collective security, that is, coercition 
or contrainte. The way international law makes use of both terms confirms that they 
have a different meaning. 
D. The International Definition 
Some fundamental international legal documents include the translation of the 
English term enforcement into French. The different meanings identified above are 
recognized, but in the field of collective security, it appears that the terms enforcement 
and coercition are often used as synonyms. 
First, although the English version of the United Nations Charter uses the term 
enforcement, the French version uses the term coercition. For example, the English 
version of Article 2(5) reads as follows: "All Members ... shall refrain from giving 
assistance to any state against which the United Nations is taking preventive or 
enforcement action." 15 The French version of this same section of the Charter, 
however, refers to action preventive ou coercitive. 16 Furthermore, the English version 
of Article 2(7) reads as follows: "[T]his principle shall not prejudice the application 
14. GERARD CORNU, VOCABULAIRE JURIDIQUE 160 (3d ed. 2002). My translation of: "Contrainte, 
d' origine etatique, exercee sur Jes biens d 'un individu (saisie) ou sa personne ( emprisonnement) comportant 
l'emploi de la force au service du Droit (pour !'execution d'une obligation) par des moyens conformes a 
la loi (par les voies de droit) a !'exclusion des voies de fait." 
15. U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 5. 
16. Id. (French text). 
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of enforcement measures under Chapter VIl." 17 The French version of this passage 
reads: "[C]e principe ne porte en rien atteinte a l'application des mesures de coercition 
prevues au Chapitre VII." 18 The English version ofthe Charter thus uses a broader term 
than the French version. Several Articles of the United Nations Charter refer to 
enforcement measures or enforcement actions; however, these references do not give 
any further information on the scope of these terms. As Georg Ress and Jurgen 
Brehmer have pointed out, the expression enforcement action 
should not be interpreted in an overly narrow fashion. The Language and systematic 
structure of the Charter does not warrant such a restrictive view and form a 
teleological point of view. The term should, as Walter has shown, be read as any 
action which would otherwise be in violation of the prohibition of the use of force as 
spelled out in Art. 2(4). 19 
Thus, the original meaning of the term "enforcement" is, in the field of collective 
security, close to the notion of "force". Therefore, enforcement will be legal or illegal, 
depending on its conformity with the United Nations Charter requirements. In the 
same vein, the General Assembly, in Resolution 2625, stated that"[ e ]very State has the 
duty to refrain from any forcible action which deprives peoples referred to in the 
elaboration of the principle of equal rights and self-determination of their right to self-
determination and freedom and independence." 20 The French text reads: "Tout Etat a 
le devoir des' abstenir de recourir a toute mesure de coercition qui priverait les peuples 
17. U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 7. 
18. Id. (French text). Article 5 of the United Nations Charter uses the term enforcement as well: "A 
Member of the United Nations against which preventive or enforcement action has been taken by the 
Security Council may be suspended from the exercise of the rights and privileges of membership by the 
General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council." U.N. Charter art. 5. In French this 
provision becomes: "Un Membre de !'Organisation contre lequel une action preventive ou coercitive a ete 
entreprise par le Conseil de securite peut etre suspendu par I' Assemblee generale, sur recommandation du 
Conseil de securite, de l'exercice des droits et privileges inherents a la qualite de Membre." Id. (French 
text). Article 45 also uses the term enforcement: "In order to enable the United Nations to take urgent 
military measures, Members shall hold immediately available national air-force contingents for combined 
international enforcement action." U.N. Charter art. 45. In French this Article provides: "Afin de 
permettre a )'Organisation de prendre d'urgence des mesures d'ordre militaire, des Membres des Nations 
Unies maintiendront des contingents nationaux de forces aeriennes immediatement utilisables en vue de 
l'execution combinee d'une action coercitive intemationale." Id. (French text). Article 50 includes the 
term enforcement as well: "If preventive or enforcement measures against any state are taken by the Security 
Council, any other state ... shall have the right to consult the Security Council with regard to a solution 
of those problems." U .N. Charter art. 50. In French this Article provides: "Si un Etat est l 'obj et de mesures 
preventives ou coercitives prises par le Conseil de securite, tout autre Etat ... a le droit de consulter le 
Conseil de securite au sujet de la solution de ces difficultes." Id. (French text). Likewise, Article 53 
contains the term enforcement: "The Security Council shall, where appropriate, utilize such regional 
arrangements or agencies for enforcement action under its authority. But no enforcement action shall be 
taken under regional arrangements or by regional agencies without the authorization of the Security Council 
.... " U.N. Charter art. 53, para. I. In French this provision reads: "Le Conseil de securite utilise, s'il y 
a lieu, Jes accords ou organismes regionaux pour )'application des mesures coercitives prises sous son 
autorite. Toutefois, aucune action coercitive ne sera entreprise en vertu d'accords regionaux ou par des 
organismes regionaux sans l'autorisation du Conseil de securite .... " Id (French text). 
19. I THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS. A COMMENT ARY 861 (Bruno Simma et al. eds., 2nd ed. 
2002) (emphasis added). 
20. G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV), at 123, U.N. Doc. A/8018 (Oct. 24, 1970) (emphasis added). 
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mentionnes ci-dessus, dans la formulation du present principe de leur droit a disposer 
d'eux-memes, de leur liberte et de leur independance." 21 
Second, Article 52 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, adopted in 
1969, provides that "[a] treaty is void ifits conclusion has been procured by the threat 
or use of force in violation of the principles of international law embodied in the 
Charter of the United Nations." 22 The title of Article 52 is: "Coercion of a State by the 
threat or use of force" while the title of French Article 52 is: "Contrainte exercee sur 
un Etat par la menace ou l'emploi de la force." 23 One should note that a non-binding 
declaration was adopted by the United Nations Conference on the Law of Treaties, 
entitled the Declaration on the Prohibition of Military, Political or Economic 
Coercion in the Conclusion of Treaties. 24 The first paragraph of the declaration 
"solemnly condemns the threat or use of pressure in any form, whether military, 
political, or economic, by any State in order to coerce another State to perform any 
act relating to the conclusion of a treaty in violation of the principles of the sovereign 
equality of States and freedom of consent." 25 Coercion is therefore considered as a 
"pressure" to perform a specific act. 
Therefore, it is possible to identify the meaning of "enforcement" in the 
framework of the United Nations. On the one hand, the French version of the United 
Nations Charter, uses the expression mesures coercitives as equivalent to the English 
term of "enforcement measures." On the other hand, if we read the Charter together 
with the General Assembly Resolution and the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties, it seems that narrower terms are sometimes preferred, such as "forcible" in 
the former and "coercion" in the latter. "Coercion" is seldom used in English and, in 
the Vienna Convention, its use is limited not just to the use of force, but to the use of 
armed force. Thus, enforcement has a broader meaning than the use of armed force and 
than the use of force tout court, in the sense of Chapter VII of the United Nations 
Charter. There is enforcement whenever there is a certain degree of force, and coercion 
measures will be the ultimate degree of enforcement measures. 
Beyond the field of collective security, the term enforcement is usually translated 
as execution. For example, the notion of enforcement has been incorporated in the 
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, part 10 of which is entitled 
"Enforcement" and contains the following articles: 
l 03, Role of States in enforcement of sentences of imprisonment; l 04, Change in 
designation of State of enforcement; 105, Enforcement of the sentence; 106, 
Supervision of enforcement of sentences and conditions of imprisonment; I 07, 
Transfer of the person upon completion of sentence; l 08, Limitation on the 
prosecution or punishment of other offences; I 09, Enforcement of fines and forfeiture 
measures; 110, Review by the Court concerning reduction of sentence; and 111, 
Escape.26 
21. Id. (French text)(emphasis added). 
22. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 52, May 23, 1969, 115 U.N.T.S. 331. 
23. Id. (English and French texts). 
24. Conference on the Law of Treaties, Declaration on the Prohibition of Military, Political or 
Economic Coercion in the Conclusion of Treaties, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.39/26 (May 23, 1969). 
25. Id. 'I[ 1 (emphasis added). 
26. United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International 
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In French, this part of the Statute is not called Coercition but Execution, and wherever 
enforcement is used in the English version, the French word execution is used. 
The terminology used in these provisions differs from the provision of the United 
Nations Charter dealing with the enforcement judgments of the International Court of 
Justice. Article 94(2) of the Charter provides: 
If any party to a case fails to perform the obligations incumbent upon it under a 
judgment rendered by the Court, the other party may have recourse to the Security 
Council, which may, if it deems necessary, make recommendations or decide upon 
measures to be taken to give effect to the judgment. 27 
In French, however, Article 94(2) refers to the "mesures a prendre pour faire executer 
l'arret." 28 Thus, the French version uses the term execution for judgments, while in 
English the term enforcement has been increasingly employed. Thus, it appears that 
enforcement is translated by coercition in the field of collective security and by 
execution where judgments are concerned. 
However, there are some "enforcement measures" that are neither coercion 
measures stricto sensu, nor the result of a judgment. To implement these measures, a 
certain degree of force is necessary-a force that could violate territorial sovereignty. 
Although the use of force is possible in such situations, the term execution in French 
is preferred. For example, in the Fisheries Jurisdiction (Spain v. Canada) case, the 
court opined: 
The Coastal Fisheries Protection Regulations Amendment of May 1994 specifies in 
further detail that force may be used by a protection officer under Section 8.1 of the 
Act only when he is satisfied that boarding cannot be achieved by "less violent means 
reasonable in the circumstances" and if one or more warning shots have been fired at 
a safe distance (Sections 19.4 and 19.5). These limitations also bring the authorized 
use of force within the category familiar in connection with enforcement of 
conservation measures. 29 
In the French version of the judgment, execution is translated as enforcement. The 
court subsequently explained that "[b]oarding, inspection, arrest and minimum use of 
force for those purposes are all contained within the concept of enforcement of 
conservation and management measures according to a 'natural and reasonable' 
interpretation of this concept." 30 Thus, it seems that the French expression measures 
coercitives is reserved for United Nations Charter Chapter VII-like measures. 
To conclude this discussion on terminology, the English term enforcement is 
clearly broader than the French term coercition. However, in the field of collective 
security, the two terms are used as if they were synonymous. The problem of the term 
coercition is that it does not cover all situations of enforcement in the field of 
collective security. The problem with the term enforcement is that it covers too many 
notions, incurring the risk of diluting its meaning. 
Criminal Court, June 15- July 17, 1998, Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, U.N. Doc. 
NCONF.183/9 (July 17, 1998). 
27. U.N. Charter art. 94, para. 2 (emphasis added). 
28. Id. (French text). 
29. Fisheries Jurisdiction Case (Spain v. Can.) 1998 I.CJ. 432,466 (Dec. 4). 
30. Id. at 433. 
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It appears that the term execution could also be used in French in the field of 
collective security, and that the use of the notion of coercition should be limited to 
circumstances where the enforcement implies the use of coercive measures. Although 
the term enforcement covers coercive measures, the latter expression should be used 
only when one is clearly referring to measures that imply the use of force-not 
necessarily armed force-with the purpose of modifying the behavior of its recipient. 
Moreover, the term execution is full of nuances. Although often used as an equivalent 
of mise en reuvre or application,3' the term can also mean the obtention par la 
contrainte de/ 'accomp/issement d'une obligation, 32 that is, the accomplishment of an 
obligation using coercion. For example, coercive measures that do not imply the use 
of armed force will frequently be enforced in the sense that there will be simply an 
application of these measures. At other times, these measures will be imposed. It is 
important to distinguish between these two modalities of enforcement, because they 
have different legal bases. Although an application is linked to the consent of the State 
that enforces, the legality of an imposition will rely on another basis, such as Security 
Council authorization. 
This Article will now proceed to an analysis of the practice of the enforcement of 
International Law by France and the United States in order to see if such linguistic 
differences imply different perspectives on what constitutes enforcement within the 
field of collective security. Both States have sought legal justification for enforcement 
action, and both States mix a stricto sensu legal approach with the invocation of 
important moral values. 
Ill. THE STRICTO SENSU LEGAL APPROACH TO ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS 
Both France and the United States have consistently professed the legality of their 
enforcement actions in the field of collective security. There are several examples 
illustrating this, and which assist in the identification of those arguments that have 
concretely been invoked. To identify these arguments, the following most paradig-
matic enforcement actions in recent practice are considered: 
NATO's intervention in Kosovo in 1999 
Intervention in Afghanistan in 2001 
Intervention in Iraq in 2003 
Intervention in the Ivory Coast in 2003 
Intervention in Haiti in 2004 
From these examples, it appears that the arguments invoked are, classically, Security 
Council authorization, self-defense, consent, and the legality of countermeasures. 
31. "Application" is defined as: An operation, which gives effect to a rule of law or an administrative 
or judicial decision, ofa fixed type or in the majority of specific situations. DICTIONNAIRE SALMON, supra 
note 10, at 73. My translation of: "Operation consistant a donner effet a une regle de droit ou a une 
decision administrative ou judiciaire, dans une espece determinee ou dans une generalite de cas 
particuliers." 
32. Id. at 478. 
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A. The Security Council as the Source of Legality 
Article 39 of the United Nations Charter-the first Article of Chapter VII-
provides that "[ t ]he Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the 
peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or 
decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain 
or restore international peace and security. "33 Articles 41 34 and 42 35 provide for a set 
of measures known in French as mesures coercitives and in English as enforcement 
measures. Where these Chapter VII conditions are met, enforcement actions will be 
legal. 
How have the United States and France been using these provisions of the United 
Nations Charter in recent practice? The NATO intervention in Kosovo is the point of 
departure in the search of legality in Security Council Resolutions, even though the 
resolutions in question did not explicitly authorize the intervention. Indeed, in the 
resolutions the Security Council adopted before the intervention, there was never an 
explicit authorization of the use of armed force. As a result, the existence of implicit 
authorization, or even of a tacit authorization, arose as notions. 
Before the commencement of NA TO military operations, the Security Council 
adopted three Resolutions, 36 none of which authorized the use of armed force. The 
Security Council considered that the situation was a threat to international peace and 
security37 and invoked Chapter VII, 38 but it only called on States "to make available 
personnel to fulfill the responsibility of carrying out effective and continuous 
international monitoring in Kosovo until the objectives of this resolution and those of 
resolution 1160 ( 1998) are achieved. "39 The Security Council then resolved, "should 
the concrete measures demanded in this resolution and resolution 1160. ( 1998) not be 
taken, [ that it would] consider further action and additional measures to maintain or 
restore peace and stability in the region.''40 
33. U.N. Charter art. 39. 
34. Article 41 provides: 
The Security Council may decide what measures not involving the use of armed force are 
to be employed to give effect to its decisions, and it may call upon the Members of the 
United Nations to apply such measures. These may include complete or partial interruption 
of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of 
communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations. 
U.N. Charter art. 41. 
35. Article 42 provides: 
Should the Security Council consider that measures provided for in Article 41 would be 
inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it may take such action by air, sea, or land 
forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security. Such 
action may include demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by air, sea, or land forces 
of Members of the United Nations. 
U.N. Charter art. 42. 
36. S.C. Res. 1160, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1160 (Mar. 31, 1998); S.C. Res. 1199, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1199 
(Sept. 23, 1998); S.C. Res. 1203, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1203 (Oct. 24, 1998). 
37. S.C. Res. II 99, supra note 36. 
38. S.C. Res. I 160, supra note 36. 
39. S.C. Res. 1199, supra note 36, ,i 9. 
40. Id. ,i 16 (emphasis added). 
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During NATO's intervention in Kosovo, the Security Council did not adopt any 
Resolution until after the conclusion of the Rambouillet agreement,41 when it adopted 
Resolution 1244 ( 1999), deciding that "a political solution to the Kosovo crisis shall 
be based on the general principles in annex 1 and as further elaborated in the principles 
and other required elements in annex 2.'"'2 This annex was a statement by the 
Chairman at the conclusion of a meeting of the G-8 Foreign Ministers and adopted on 
May 6, 1999. One of the principles enunciated in the statement was the"[ d]eployrnent 
in Kosovo of effective international civil and security presences, endorsed and adopted 
by the United Nations, capable of guaranteeing the achievement of the common 
objectives.'"' 3 Therefore, the Security Council authorized the establishment of an 
"international security presence in Kosovo as set out in point 4 of annex 2 with all 
necessary means to fulfill its responsibilities.''44 Thus, in this case, there was neither 
an implicit, nor a tacit authorization of military operations, chiefly aerial bombardment, 
of the Federal Republic ofYugoslavia (FRY). But the actions ofNATO States, seek-
ing such a legal basis, demonstrated that such a foundation was a fundamental justifi-
cation for their armed intervention. 
The intervention in Iraq is another clear example of the desire to use Security 
Council Resolutions to justify the legality of intervention. For example, in a letter 
addressed to the President of the Security Council, the Permanent Representative of 
the United States to the United Nations explained why the Security Council 
Resolutions provided a legal basis for armed intervention in Iraq: 
These operations are necessary in view oflraq's continued material breaches of its 
disarmament obligations under relevant Security Council resolutions, including 
resolution 1441 (2002). The operations are substantial and will secure compliance 
with those obligations. In carrying out these operations, our forces will take all 
reasonable precautions to avoid civilian casualties. 
The actions being taken are authorized under existing Council resolutions, 
including its resolutions 678 (] 990) and 687(]991). Resolution 687 ( 1991) imposed 
a series of obligations on Iraq, including, most importantly, extensive disarmament 
obligations, that were conditions of the ceasefire established under it. It has been 
long recognized and understood that a material breach of these obligations removes 
the basis of the ceasefire and revives the authority to use force under resolution 678 
(1990). 45 
What is important here is not the reality of the legal basis but the necessity of finding 
it, whatever it may have been. Moreover, the legal basis for the Iraq intervention was 
transformed from one based on Resolution 687 into one based on the need to eliminate 
weapons of mass destruction. In a letter addressed to the President of the Security 
Council, the Permanent Representatives of the United Kingdom and the United States 
to the United Nations explained that: 
41. U .N. Sec. Council, Rambouillet Accords: Interim Agreement for Peace and Self-Government in 
Kosovo, Annex, S/1999/648 (June 7, 1999). 
42. S.C. Res. 1244, ,i I, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1244 (June 10, 1999). 
43. Id. at Annex I (emphasis added). 
44. Id. ,i 7. 
45. Letter dated 21 March 2003 from the Permanent Representative of the United States to the 
President of the Security Council, fl 1-2, U.N. Doc. S/2003/351, (Mar. 21, 2003) (emphasis added). 
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The United States of America, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern 
Ireland and Coalition partners continue to act together to ensure the complete 
disarmament of Iraq of weapons of mass destruction and means of delivery in 
accordance with United Nations Security Council resolutions. The States participating 
in the Coalition will strictly abide by their obligations under international law, 
including those relating to the essential humanitarian needs of the people oflraq. We 
will act to ensure that Iraq's oil is protected and used for the benefit of the Iraqi 
people. 46 
In the case of Kosovo, the American and French positions were consistent, as they are 
both member States ofNATO. With respect to Iraq, however, France did not support 
the American position. 
Yet, France decided to send troops to Afghanistan after the Security Council 
recognized that the September 11 attacks allowed a response based on self-defense. 
Although Security Council authorization was not necessary for action in Afghanistan 
(if indeed this was a case of self-defense), it seems that Security Council recognition 
of the legality of the action was important for France. As was stated in a letter: 
On instructions from my Government, following the terrorist attacks perpetrated in 
the United States of America on 11 September 2001, I have the honor to inform you 
that, in accordance with the exercise of the inherent right of individual or collective 
self-defense (Article 51 of the Charter), referred to in Security Council resolution 
1368 (2001), and in response to the encouragement addressed to Member States by 
the Council in paragraph 5 of its resolution 1378 (2001), France has undertaken 
action involving the participation of military air, land and naval forces.47 
The legal basis of the intervention in Afghanistan transcends a Security Council 
Resolution, which seems to be more like an endorsement. It rests ultimately on the 
right of individual or collective self-defense, which is a fundamental exception to the 
prohibition of the use of force. 
B. Extension of the Self-Defense Exception 
Self-defense is also invoked by France and the United States to justify the legality 
of enforcement action. The Permanent Representative of the United States to the 
United Nations, in a letter addressed to the President of the Security Council, after the 
September 11, 2001 attacks, declared: 
In accordance with Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, I wish, on behalf 
of my Government, to report that the United States of America, together with other 
States, has initiated actions in the exercise of its inherent right of individual and 
collective self-defence following the armed attacks that were carried out against the 
United States on 11 September 2001.48 
46. Letter dated 8 May 2003 from the Permanent Representatives of the United Kingdom of Great 
Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America to the United Nations addressed to the 
President of the Security Council, ,r I, U.N. Doc. S/2003/538 (May 8, 2003) (emphasis added). 
4 7. Letter dated 23 November 200 I from the Permanent Representative ofFrance to the United Nations 
addressed to the President of the Security Council, ,r I, U.N. Doc. S/2001/1103 (Nov. 23, 2001) 
[hereinafter U.N. Letter S/2001/1103]. 
48. Letter dated 7 October 2001 from the Permanent Representative of the United States of America 
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Thus, not only the United States, but at least all the members of the Security Council 
accepted the intervention in Afghanistan on the basis of self-defense, although the 
September 11th attacks created a situation in which it was more than difficult to rely 
on self-defense as an argument. The first problem was to determine against whom force 
could be exercised in self-defense. Al-Qaida was and is not a State, and it was 
impossible to use such an argument directly against a terrorist organization. Therefore, 
due to the link between Al-Qaida and the Taliban regime in power in Afghanistan, it 
was considered that self-defense could be used to justify the use of force against the 
latter. This argument can be rejected for purely formalistic reasons, or accepted if one 
recognizes the de facto link between Al-Qaida and the Taliban regime. But this is not 
the major criticism of the reliance of self-defense in the Afghanistan case. The most 
serious problem is the non-observance of the notion of self-defense itself. Indeed, if 
one examines this practice in light of United Nations Charter Article 51, it is clear that 
the members of the Security Council have strayed from their responsibilities. Article 
51 provides that: 
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or 
collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United 
Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain 
international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this 
right of self-defence shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall 
not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under 
the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to 
maintain or restore international peace and security.49 
However, in Afghanistan, the Security Council never took such "measures necessary 
to maintain international peace and security." Although there was dire need to maintain 
and restore international peace and security in the aftermath of the September 11, 
2001, attacks, the Security Council never exercised its responsibility. In that sense, it 
is arguable that other members of the Security Council, and notably France, were 
accomplices to the United States in undermining the Security Council's powers and, 
in reality, the whole system of collective security. By failing to respond proactively, 
the Security Council ignored an important breach of international peace and security 
and, in doing so, seemed to accept the breach itself. 
C. State Consent 
Another argument used to justify the legality of armed intervention has been the 
consent of the State in which the intervention takes place. For example, in the Ivory 
Coast, France contended that the Government and the rebels had asked France to 
monitor the cease-fire that they had reached. The parties to the Linas-Marcoussis 
agreement welcomed the cease-fire, which was "made possible and guaranteed by the 
deployment of ECOW AS forces supported by French forces." 50 
to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council, 11, U.N. Doc. S/2001/946 (Oct. 
7, 200 I) ( emphasis added). 
49. U.N. Charter art. 51 (emphasis added). 
50. Letter dated 27 January 2003 from the Permanent Representative of France to the United Nations 
addressed to the President of the Security Council, Annex I (Linas-Marcoussis Agreement), 12, U.N. Doc. 
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The Western European Union (WEU) clearly recognizes the legality of 
interventions in States that have consented to an intervention. For example, with 
respect to French interventions in several African States, the Rapporteur of the Defence 
Committee declared that "[b ]eyond the evacuation of French citizens protected by the 
French consulate and other Foreign citizens, and the protecting of French property, 
these interventions are generally made with the objective of reestablishing order, 
suppressing rebellion and crushing insurrections at an early stage. "51 The 
organization then concluded that, as long as these interventions were based on prior 
defense agreements, United Nations authorization would be unnecessary. 52 
It appears, therefore, that both the United States and France have a utilitarian 
appreciation of the United Nations Security Council, as enforcement actions are often 
justified on behalf of a Security Council authorization. However, legal arguments do 
not stand alone; they frequently underlie a moral conception of what the international 
order should be, thereby indicating that the relationship between law and morals 
remains undefined. 
IV. LEGITIMATE ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS: 
WHERE AND WHEN LAW MEETS MORALITY 
Other arguments, which go further than legality stricto sensu, have been invoked 
to justify enforcement actions. Indeed, States sometimes invoke moral values, often in 
addition to the legal arguments examined earlier in this Article. A real tension appears 
then between enforcement actions and certain moral values. It is often very super-
ficially said that the United States has a moral approach to international relations and 
that the arguments Americans invoke are far from being merely legal. But this is not 
only an American characteristic. Ifwe examine recent enforcement actions led by the 
United States and/or France, we see that they have both argued moral considerations 
in order to legitimize actions, which were often clearly illegal. 
A. Tension Between Legality and Legitimacy 
Very often, legality and legitimacy justifications for enforcement actions are 
mixed. For example, during the 1993 crisis in Haiti, the Security Council determined 
that the situation there threatened international peace and security. 53 Afterwards, the 
Council of the European Communities specified which facts had created such a threat: 
"[t]he Community and its Member States, meeting within the framework of political 
cooperation, have repeatedly expressed their concern about the persistent absence of 
S/2003/99 (Jan. 27, 2003). 
51. Western European Union Assembly, Defence Committee, La contribution de /'UEO au 
renforcement de la paix en Afrique centrale, § 124, at 23, WEU Doc. 1566 (May 13, 1997) (prepared by 
M. Masseret, Rapporteur, Rec. 612) (emphasis added) [hereinafter WEU Committee Report]. My 
translation of: "Outre !'evacuation des ressortissants fran\:ais et d'autres citoyens etrangers et la protection 
de biens fran\:ais, ces interventions avaient generalement pour objectif de retablir l'ordre, d'etouffer les 
rebellions ou d'ecraser les mutineries a un stade peu avance."). 
52. Id. 
53. S.C. Res. 841, ,i 14, U.N. Doc. S/RES/841 (June 16, 1993)(detennining''that, in these unique and 
exceptional circumstances, the continuation of this situation threatens international peace and security in 
the region"). 
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democracy and the rule of law in Haiti and the need for effective action to end this 
situation. "54 
Thus, from the European perspective, it was the absence of democracy and the rule 
of law that had justified an enforcement action against Haiti. At the time, however, it 
was not clear whether or not there had been a violation of international law. Instead, 
European values and the European conception of what the international order should 
be served as acceptable reasons for the Security Council's adoption of a Resolution to 
intervene in Haiti. 
More recently, during the 2004 crisis in Haiti, the French Foreign Affairs Minister, 
Dominique de Villepin, made the following declaration: 
The situation in Haiti is continuing to deteriorate. 
A race in [sic] under way between those who support violence and those who are still 
hoping for a peaceful solution. Haiti is now threatened with chaos. It is the duty of 
the international community to assume its responsibility to preserve the country from 
disorder and violence 
All of the above must be legitimized and implemented by the international 
community. 
- Our proposals could be submitted to the OAS and CARICOM and the plan, 
thus strengthened, could be conveyed to the United Nations for adoption by the 
Security Council. 55 
Foreign Minister Villepin's declaration invokes other ill-defined notions to justify 
international intervention: disorder, violence and chaos. 
The NATO intervention in Kosovo was probably the clearest example of the 
tension between law and morality. We have already examined the different legal 
arguments advanced to justify this intervention. In addition, however, non-legal 
arguments were put forth to justify the NATO intervention. NATO declared during 
its Washington Summit on Kosovo: 
NATO's military action against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) supports 
the political aims of the international community, which were reaffirmed in recent 
statements by the UN Secretary-General and the European Union: a peacefa/, multi-
ethnic and democratic Kosovo where all its people can live in security and enjoy 
universal human rights and freedoms on an equal basis.56 
54. Council Regulation (EEC) No. 1608/93 of 24 June 1993, preamble, 1993 O.J. (L 155) 2, 2 
(introducing an embargo concerning certain trade between the European Economic Community and Haiti) 
(emphasis added). 
55. Letter dated 25 February2004 from the Permanent Representatives ofFrance to the United Nations 
addressed to the President of the Security Council, Annex (Statement by the Minister for Foreign Affairs 
of France, Dominique de Villepin, on the situation in Haiti), ff 1-2, 7, U.N. Doc. S/2004/145 (Feb. 25, 
2004) (emphasis added). 
56. Press Release, NATO, Statement on Kosovo ,i 2, NATO Doc. S-1(99)62 (Apr. 23, 1999) 
[hereinafter Statement on Kosovo) (emphasis added). 
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In this regard, General Wesley K. Clark, Supreme Allied Commander in Europe 
justified the aerial intervention in the Federal Republic ofYugoslavia by describing the 
scene in moral terms: 
Allied military forces were confronted daily with the horrific consequences of "ethnic 
cleansing"-the deliberate violent expulsion of an entire people from their native 
land. Even from 15,000 feet above Kosovo, the evidence was all too clear: empty, 
destroyed villages; hundreds of thousands of people on the move; the smoke of 
thousands of burning homes. On the ground, the stories of cruelty and abuse-
summary executions, organised rape and beatings perpetrated on young and old 
alike-bore even closer witness to the campaign of terror waged by the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia against its Albanian minority.57 
The attacks by the Allied Force were therefore justified on behalf of "the values for 
which NATO has stood since its foundation: democracy, human rights and the rule of 
law."58 Actions undertaken by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia were considered to 
be ''the culmination of a deliberate policy of oppression, ethnic cleansing and violence 
pursued by the Belgrade regime under the direction of President Milosevic." 59 Thus, 
atrocities against the people ofKosovo by Yugoslav military, police, and paramilitary 
forces "represent a flagrant violation of international law."60 
Earlier, the European Union had adopted a declaration on the NATO intervention, 
considering whether the intervention was justified by humanitarian reasons. The 
European Council pointed out that the objective ofNATO actions was ''to put an end 
to the humanitarian catastrophe in Kosovo." 61 
The argument of countermeasures has also been used to justify enforcement 
actions in the field of collective security. These countermeasures-mainly economic 
sanctions-are a means to enforce international law. How do the United States and the 
European Union justify the adoption of economic sanctions? They usually invoke a 
previous violation of existing international obligations by the sanctioned country. But 
such a violation usually accompanies the existence of a threat to international peace 
and security and underlies the violation of a plethora of ill-defined moral values. 
For example, although the United States argues that the adoption of sanctions 
results from a country's breach of democratic principles, the European Union will 
build democratic principles into treaties with third States and, when these principles 
have been violated, will terminate the treaty as a countermeasure. 
Therefore, the international regime for economic sanctions adopted against third 
States has to follow the countermeasures regime. Accordingly, countermeasures are 
taken by a State that has been injured by the violation of an obligation. However, the 
International Law Commission's (ILC) Draft Articles on State Responsibility has 
created major controversies over whether or not States other than the injured State 
have the right to adopt countermeasures. In its commentary, the ILC explains that: 
57. Wesley K. Clark, When Force is Necessary: NATO's Military Response to the Kosovo Crisis, 
NATO REVIEW, Summer 1999, at 14. 
58. Statement on Kosovo, supra note 56, ,r 1. 
59. Id. 
60. Id. ,r 11. 
61. Presidency Conclusions, European Council on Kosovo (Mar. 25, 1999), available at 
http://europa.eu.int/abc/doc/off/bull/en/9903/i 1041.htm. 
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One issue is whether countermeasures may be taken by third States which are not 
themselves individually injured by the internationally wrongful act in question, 
although they are owed the obligation which has been breached. For example, in the 
case of an obligation owed to the international community as a whole the 
International Court has affirmed that all States have a legal interest in compliance. 
Article 54 leaves open the question whether any State may take measures to ensure 
compliance with certain international obligations in the general interest as distinct 
from its own individual interest as an injured State. While article 22 does not cover 
measures taken in such a case to the extent that these do not qualify as counter-
measures, neither does it exclude that possibility. 62 
This statement shows the lack of agreement in the ILC on this question and the subse-
quent choice to let the question remain open instead of clearly establishing whether or 
not third States can adopt countermeasures. 
In some cases, the threat to international peace and security has been considered 
a violation of a collective interest When Iraq occupied Kuwait, and also during the 
NATO intervention in Kosovo, the European Community adopted several enforcement 
measures like embargos, legislation permitting assets to be frozen, and bans on 
flights. 63 For some of its Member States, 64 such a prohibition made it impossible to 
enforce several bilateral aerial agreements: 
Because of doubts about the legitimacy of the action, the British government initially 
was prepared to follow the one-year denunciation procedure provided for in article 
17 of its agreement with Yugoslavia. However, it later changed its position and 
denounced flights with immediate effect. Justifying the measure, it stated that 
"President Milosevic's ... worsening record on human rights, means that, on moral 
and political grounds, he has forfeited the right ofhis Government to insist on the 12 
months notice which would normally apply.''65 
These measures serve as an intervention responding to a threat to international peace 
and security. States have therefore claimed that they were adopted for the protection 
of a collective interest. The ILC Draft provides that any State other than an injured 
State is entitled to act in response if"[t]he obligation breached is owed to a group of 
States including that State, and is established for the protection of a collective interest 
62. U.N. Int'! Law Comm'n, Report of the International Law Commission: Fifty-third session (23 
April-I June and 2 July-10 August 2001), 182-83, U.N. Doc. A/56/10 (2001), available at http://untreaty 
.un.org/ilc/reports/2001/2001report.htm [hereinafter Report of the International Law Commission]. 
63. See Marian Nash Leich, Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to International 
Law, 84 AM. J. INT'LL. 885,903 (1990) (referring to President Bush's August 2, 1990 Executive Orders). 
See also Council Common Position (EC) No. 326/1998 of7 May 1998, 1998 O.J. (L 143) I (defined by 
the Council on the basis of Article J.2 of the Treaty on the European Union concerning the freezing of funds 
held abroad by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and Serbian Governments); Council Common Position 
(EC) No. 426/1998 of29 June 1998, 1998 O.J. (L 190) 3 (defined by the Council on the basis of Article 
J.2 of the Treaty on the European Union concerning a ban on flights by Yugoslav carriers between the 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the European Community). 
64. More specifically, Germany, France, and the United Kingdom. 
65. Report of the International Law Commission, supra note 62, at 353. Afterwards "[t]he Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia protested these measures as 'unlawful, unilateral and an example of the policy of 
discrimination."' Id. 
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of the group. "66 The validity of this provision is more than uncertain. In this sense, 
even the ILC noted that: 
(T]he current state of international law on countermeasures taken in the general or 
collective interest is uncertain. State practice is sparse and involves a limited number 
of States. At present there appears to be no clearly recognized entitlement of States 
referred to in article 48 to take countermeasures in the collective interest. 
Consequently it is not appropriate to include in the present Articles a provision 
concerning the question whether other States, identified in article 48, are permitted 
to take countermeasures in order to induce a responsible State to comply with its 
obligations. Instead chapter II includes a saving clause which reserves the position 
and leaves the resolution of the matter to the further development of international 
law.67 
Therefore, Article 54, as it has been presented by Rapporteur J. Crawford remains 
unsupported by contemporary practice. Article 54 does not codify international law but 
contains instead a saving clause which leaves open a question to be decided at a later 
date. 68 The ILC commentary thus implies that, for States other than the injured State, 
international practice only recognizes the possibility to react with legal measures but 
not with unlawful measures no matter how legitimate they may seem. Thus, this Article 
is very limited, as it only reaffirms the legality of retaliatory measures. 
Treaty practice also demonstrates the importance of certain values and how a 
treaty violation could form the basis for enforcement action. In Europe, the inclusion 
of conditionality provisions in treaties between an organization and a third State has 
been conceived as a tool to further respect for human rights, democratic principles, the 
rule of Jaw, and good governance in public affairs (bonne gestion des affaires 
publiques).69 The partnership agreement between the members of the African, 
Caribbean, and Pacific Group of States and the European Community and its member 
States provides: "Respect for human rights, democratic principles and the rule oflaw, 
which underpin the ACP-EU Partnership, shall underpin the domestic and international 
policies of the Parties and constitute the essential elements of this Agreement." 70 In 
the next paragraph, it adds that: "Good governance, which underpins the ACP-EU 
66. Id.at 318. 
67. Id. at 355. 
68. For a discussion of ambiguities relating to the adoption of collective countermeasures, see Linos-
Alexandros Sicilianos, The Classification of Obligations and the Multilateral Dimension of the Relations 
of International Responsibility, 13 EUR. J. INT'L L. 1127, 1141-44 (2002). 
69. See, e.g.. Peter Ballantyne, La conditionna/ite sur la sellette, LoME 2000, May 1997, at 3; Peter 
Ballantyne, Les accords de /'UE avec /es pays tiers: des ler;ons pour /'apres-Lome?, LoME 2000, Oct. 
1997, at 2; Isabelle Biagiotti & Peter Uvin, Nouvelles conditions de I 'aide-Au service de la democratie?, 
LECOURRIER DE LAPLANETE, Mar.-Apr. 1996, at 19-21; Yannick Jadot, Vers un nouveau partenariat UE-
ACP? De la conditionna/ite au contrat, SOLAGRAL, Jan. 1999; Andre Monkam, Les dimensions po/itiques 
du futur partenariat: comment promouvoir droits de/ 'homme, democratie et gouvernance, Document de 
travail, ECDPM, Sept. 1997. 
70. Partnership Agreement (EC) No. 483/2000 of 23 June 2000, art. 9, 2000 O.J. (L 317) 3, 9 
(Partnership agreement between the members of the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States of the 
one part, and the European Community and its Member States, of the other part, signed in Cotonou). 
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Partnership, shall underpin the domestic and international policies of the Parties and 
constitute a fundamental element of this Agreement." 71 
Article 96 of the same agreement provides that there will be consultations in the 
event that these principles are violated. Furthermore, it provides that: "If the 
consultations do not lead to a solution acceptable to both Parties, if consultation is 
refused, or in cases of special urgency, appropriate measures may be taken. These 
measures shall be revoked as soon as the reasons for taking them have disappeared. "72 
Similarly, the Common Position of June 2, 1997 of the European Union Council 
concerning conflict prevention and resolution in Africa provides that in order "to 
contribute better to the prevention and resolution of conflicts in Africa," the European 
Union shall notably seek "to use the various instruments available coherently to 
promote effective conflict prevention and resolution. "73 For that purpose, the Council 
notes that: 
[I]n accordance with the relevant procedures, steps will be taken to ensure 
coordination of the efforts of the European Community and those of the Member 
States in this field, including with regard to development cooperation and the support 
for human rights, democracy, the rule of law and good governance. 74 
Thus, the European Union Council considers that conditionality provisions in treaties 
with African states are a conflict prevention and resolution measure. For example, the 
expulsion of the Head of the European Union Electoral Mission from Zimbabwe on 
February 16, 2002, led to the European Union's adoption of a common position which 
expressed serious concern about the situation in Zimbabwe and notably about "recent 
legislation in Zimbabwe which, if enforced, would seriously infringe on the right to 
freedom of speech, assembly and association, mainly the Public Order and Security 
Act and the General Laws Amendment Act." 75 The EU Council then decided that it 
would close "the consultations conducted under Article 96 of the ACP-EC Partnership 
Agreement and implement targeted sanctions." 76 
B. Confusion Between Legitimacy and National Interests 
In a declaration, the WEU Rapporteur considered that Europe should take the 
place of the United States, as it had abandoned any global responsibility, as long as its 
Id. 
71. Id. 
72. Id. art. 9 at 40. This article specifies what "appropriate measures" are: 
The "appropriate measures" referred to in this Article are measures taken in accordance with 
international Jaw, and proportional to the violation. In the selection of these measures, 
priority must be given to those which least disrupt the application of this agreement. It is 
understood that suspension would be a measure oflast resort. 
73. Council Common Position (EC) No. 356/1997 of2 June 1997, art. 3, 1997 O.J. (L 153) 1, I 
( defined by the Council on the basis of Article J .2 of the Treaty on the European Union, concerning conflict 
prevention and resolution in Africa). 
74. Id. 
75. Council Common Position (EC) No. 145/2002 of 18 February 2002, preamble, 2002 O.J. (L 50) 
1, 1. 
16. Id. 
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security or its national interests were not affected. 77 He affirmed in this regard that "if 
Europe wishes to play or is forced to play a more important role in certain regions of 
the world where its security and vital interests are at stake, it should be prepared to take 
measures that could end in deployment of force and military intervention "78 
However, if French interventions are closely examined, it is hard to see how 
France is assuming global responsibility in the field ofinternational peace and security. 
France will only intervene when it has an interest in such an intervention. Unilateral 
peacekeeping operations demonstrate this phenomenon very well. These operations 
have not been initiated by the United Nations, the Security Council, or by any 
subsidiary body. The operations have been undertaken outside the United Nations 
System, except for United Nations authorization. For example, the French Operation 
Licorne in the Ivory Coast was authorized by Resolution 1464 (2003)79 and the 
Multinational Interim Force in Haiti by Resolution 1529 (2004).80 Thus, the United 
Nations only authorized these operations and the possible use of force should it 
become necessary to defend their missions. 
Therefore, sixty years after the creation of the United Nations and a major effort 
to have global operations led by the United Nations, the prevalence of operations led 
by an individual country is a huge step back. Instead of trying to find new ways to 
reinforce the United Nations system, States like the United States or France have 
preferred to go back to the solution of individual actions. Although they are probably 
more efficient in the short-term, in the long-run, it is difficult to say that they will 
create acceptable solutions for the States where they intervene. In any case, though, it 
is a clear breach of the United Nations collective security system. Moreover, the 
examples of the FIAS in Afghanistan, the Multinational Interim Force in Haiti, the 
Operation Licorne in the Ivory Coast, or ECOFORCE and ECOMIL in Western Africa 
indicate that States only deploy troops when they have an interest to defend. 
V. CONCLUSION: DETERIORATION OF THE COLLECTIVE SECURITY SYSTEM BY 
FRANCE AND THE UNITED STATES 
In a 2001 Resolution, the Security Council declared that it was ready ''to take all 
necessary steps to respond to the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, and to combat 
all forms of terrorism, in accordance with its responsibilities under the Charter of the 
United Nations." 81 At the end of the day, however, the Security Council, although it 
had been taking some controversial measures to combat terrorism, never responded to 
the September 11th attacks, failing to assume its responsibilities under the United 
Nations Charter. As Alain Pellet noted, regarding the failure of the Security Council 
77. WEU Committee Report, supra note 53, ,r 135, at 24. In French, M. Masseret's original statement 
declared that the United States "se sont decharges de toute responsabilite a l'echelle mondiale, des lors que 
leur securite et leurs interets nationaux ne sont pas directement touches." 
78. Id. My translation of: "Si l'Europe souhaite ou n'a pas d'autre choix que de jouer un role plus 
important dans certaines regions du monde ou sa propre securite et ses interets vitaux sont en jeu, elle devra 
se preparer a prendre des initiatives qui pourront aboutir au deploiement d'une force d'intervention 
militaire." 
79. S.C. Res. 1464, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1464 (Feb. 4, 2003). 
80. S.C. Res. 1529, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1529 (Feb. 29, 2004). 
81. S.C. Res. 1368, ,r 5, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1368 (Sept. 12, 2001). 
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to adopt retaliatory measures in response to the September 11th attacks: "Even though 
peace and global international security are threatened, The United Nations leaves the 
playing field wide open to the United States. This conforms neither to the spirit of the 
[United Nations] Charter, the Declaration of Intention of September 12th, nor to the 
concept of collective security." 82 No proper vehicle has been found, therefore, for the 
Security Council to exercise its powers, despite the euphoria resulting from the end of 
the Cold War and the subsequent revitalization of Chapter VII of the Charter. 
Jurgen Habermas wrote an interesting essay after the 2003 Iraq intervention in 
which he tried to clarify the differences between "the continental European and the 
Anglo-American powers" over strategies for justifying military actions: 
The Europeans had drawn the lesson from the disaster at Srebrenica: they understood 
armed intervention as a way of closing the gap between efficiency and legitimacy that 
had been opened by earlier peacekeeping operations, and thus saw it as a means for 
making progress toward fully institutionalized civil rights. England and America, 
conversely, satisfied themselves with the normative goal of promulgating their own 
liberal order internationally, through violence if necessary. At the time of the 
intervention in Kosovo, I had attributed this difference to contrasting traditions of 
legal thought-Kant's cosmopolitanism on the one side, John Stuart Mill's liberal 
nationalism on the other. But in light of the hegemonic unilateralism that the leading 
thinkers of the Bush Doctrine have pursued since 1991 (see the documentation by 
Stefan Frolich in the FAZ from April 10th, 2003 ), one suspects in hindsight that the 
American delegation had already led the negotiations at Rambouillet from just this 
peculiar viewpoint. 83 
We think that, indeed, the differences between the Anglo-American conception 
regarding international law and the Continental-European conception cannot be found 
in a legalistic approach. We cannot clearly state, however, that while Continental-
Europe wants to progress toward fully institutionalized civil rights, America wants only 
to impose a liberal order. French practice demonstrates that France acts not only when 
necessary to protect civil rights, but also when necessary to protect national interests. 
Similarly, the United States acts to impose a liberal order, but actually appears more 
driven to engage in enforcement actions when necessary to defend national interests. 
In the same article, Habermas asserts that the American decision to consult the 
Security Council "certainly didn't arise from any wish for legitimation through 
international law, which had long since been regarded, at least internally, as 
superfluous. Rather, this rear-guard action was desired only insofar as it broadened the 
basis for a 'coalition of the willing, 'and soothed a worried population." 84 Similarly, 
the Security Council adopted Resolution 1464 after France initiated Operation Licome 
82. Alain Pellet, Malaise dans la guelle: a quoi sert l'ONU?, LE MONDE, Nov. 15, 2001 (emphasis 
added). My translation of: "[B]ien meme, c'est la paix et la securite intemationales globales qui sont 
menacees, les Nations unies laissent le champ libre aux Etats-Unis. Ce n'est conforme ni a !'esprit de la 
Charte ni a la declaration d'intention du 12 septembre, ni a l'idee meme de securite collective." 
83. Jiirgen Habermas, Interpreting the Fall of a Monument, 4 GERMAN L. J. 701, 703-04 (2003) 
( emphasis added). 
84. Id at 704 (emphasis added). 
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in the Ivory Coast. 85 In addition, France only consulted the Security Council for an 
"endorsement" rather than for authorization. 86 
In conclusion, an examination of recent practice shows that individual States-not 
only the United States but other States including France-have contributed to the 
fragility of the collective security system designed by the United Nations Charter. The 
Security Council and its member States, however, have also significantly contributed 
to the disintegration of the collective security system. On the one hand, the Security 
Council is expanding its powers beyond what is envisioned in the United Nations 
Charter, as exemplified by its actions in defining terrorism. On the other hand, 
however, the Security Council has not been assuming full responsibility when there is 
a threat to or breach of international peace and security. Thus, for other States to point 
to the United States as the main culprit in the decline of the United Nations is a failure 
of those States to assume responsibility for their own complicity in this failure. 
Although France is often considered an ardent defender of the useful "machin," as 
General de Gaulle referred to the United Nations, its actions are paradigmatic of the 
bad faith of other States, and mainly of the members of the Security Council who still 
benefit from the veto power. 
85. S.C. Res. 1464, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1464 (Feb. 4, 2003). 
86. In the Conclusions of the Conference of Heads of State on Cote d'Ivoire, it was stated that the 
Linas-Marcoussis agreement: "affirms the importance of support from the States members of ECO WAS 
and the United Nations in restoring peace and security in Cote d'Ivoire ... and welcomes the adoption of 
the statement issued by the President of the United Nations Security Council on 20 December 2002, which 
endorsed that deployment." Letter dated 27, January 2003 from the Permanent Representative of France 
to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council, Annex II (Conclusions of the 
Conference of Heads of State on Cote d'Ivoire), ,i 13, U.N. Doc. S/2003/99 (Jan. 27, 2003) (emphasis 
added). 
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